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Barbarian thoughts: imperialism in the
philosophy of John Stuart Mill
BEATE JAHN*
Abstract. Mill’s political and his international theory rest on a philosophy of history drawn in
turn from the experience of nineteenth century imperialism. And yet, this philosophy of history
remains unexamined in Political Theory and International Relations (IR) alike, largely because
of the peculiar division of labour between the two disciplines. In this article I will argue that
this omission results not just in a misconception of those aspects of Mill’s thought with which
Political Theory and IR directly engage; in addition, and more seriously, it has led in both
disciplines to an unreflected perpetuation of Mill’s justification of imperialism.
John Stuart Mill occupies an eminent position in Political Theory traditionally
associated with the support of liberty and free speech. Recently, however, this reading
of Mill has come under critical scrutiny. Mill’s liberalism, it is argued, is inextricably
linked to imperialism which, in turn, is reproduced through liberal practices in the
contemporary world.1 Imperialism, however, as a concept and a practice, falls squarely
into the disciplinary domain of IR, especially so in a time in which the concept of
empire ‘has made what can only be described as a dramatic intellectual comeback’.2
And yet, despite the fact that Mill worked in India House for 35 years and, thus,
was directly involved in international politics in the form of governing the Indian
subcontinent (as well as writing extensively about international aﬀairs in his
newspaper articles and in his philosophical texts), he is rarely invoked in the IR
literature. And when he is mentioned, it is usually with reference to an extract from
his short essay A Few Words on Non-Intervention.3 This eﬀectively confines Mill’s
* I would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their encouraging comments and suggestions
of further enquiry as well as David Boucher and his colleagues and students at Cardiﬀ for the
opportunity to present my interpretation of Mill to ‘proper’ Political Theorists. Their reflections
helped to strengthen the article. Thanks are also due to Barry Hindess for his comments and
suggestions and to Justin Rosenberg, as always, for helping with structure, grammar, and style.
1 Paul A. Passavant, No Escape: Freedom of Speech and the Paradox of Rights (New York: New York
University Press, 2002); Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire (Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press, 1999); Eddy M. Souﬀrant, Formal Transgressions: John Stuart Mill’s Philosophy of
International Aﬀairs (Lanham: Roman and Littlefield, 2000); Bikhu Parekh, ‘Decolonizing
Liberalism’, in Aleksandras Shtromas (ed.), The End of ‘Isms’! (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) pp. 85–103;
Barry Hindess, ‘Liberalism – What’s in a Name?’, in Wendy Warner and William Walters (eds.),
Global Governmentality (London: Routledge, 2004); Jennifer Pitts, ‘Legislator of the World?’ in
Political Theory, 31 (2003).
2 Michael Cox, ‘The Empire’s Back in Town: or America’s Imperial Temptation – Again’, in
Millennium, 32 (2003), p. 5.
3 John Stuart Mill, ‘A Few Words on Non-Intervention’ in John M. Robson (ed.), The Collected
Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), vol. XXI, pp. 109–24. See,
for example, Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977),
pp. 251f; Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1979), especially Part II, chs. 2 and 3; John Vincent, Nonintervention and
International Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 54–6; Michael Walzer,
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relevance to the debate over foreign intervention in those states which were
recognised as equal and sovereign members of the society of states – mainly
European states and European settler states.
Traditionally, Political Theory has neglected the role of the international in Mill’s
philosophy.4 Conversely, IR has neglected the importance of Mill’s political theory.
And both have avoided an engagement with the role of imperialism in Mill’s political
and international theory. Mill’s justification of imperialism rests on a philosophy of
history which underlies both his political and his international theory. And yet, this
philosophy of history, so central to Mill’s thought, remains unexamined in Political
Theory and IR alike, largely because of the peculiar division of labour between the
two disciplines. In this article I will argue that this omission results not just in a
misconception of those aspects of Mill’s thought with which Political Theory and IR
directly engage; in addition, and more seriously, it has led in both disciplines to an
unreflected perpetuation of Mill’s philosophy of history itself. And this philosophy is
rooted in a need to justify the political inequality of humanity on cultural grounds.
Contra IR, I will argue, Mill’s argument about non-intervention among civilised
states is an organic component of a wider theory of international relations in which
Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1992), pp. 87–96; Georgios Varouxakis, ‘John
Stuart Mill on Intervention and Non-Intervention’, Millennium, 26 (1997), pp. 57–76; Robert
Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990). Jackson engages quite extensively with Mill’s arguments and
also quotes Utilitarianism and On Liberty, but the discussion itself revolves around questions of
sovereignty and intervention. A shortened version of A Few Words on Non-Intervention has also
been included in a recent anthology edited by Chris Brown, Terry Nardin and Nicholas Rengger,
International Relations in Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), which
again does not make reference to any other of John Stuart Mill’s writings. At the same time, John
Stuart Mill is not mentioned, for instance, in Gerrit Gong’s The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in
International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) despite the fact that the book addresses the
emergence of culturally based international theory and practice in the 19th century for which Mill
must count as an outstanding representative.
4 In Political Theory A Few Words on Non-Intervention is hardly ever mentioned. Instead, leading
among the texts which attract the attention of political philosophers is On Liberty edited by David
Spitz (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975) followed, in no particular order, by ‘Considerations on
Representative Government’ in On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), pp. 203–467; Principles of Political Economy, edited by Jonathan Riley
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); ‘The Subjection of Women’ in On Liberty and Other
Essays, pp. 469–582; ‘Utilitarianism’ in John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham (London: Penguin,
1987), pp. 272–338; ‘Coleridge’ in Mill and Bentham, pp. 177–226; and ‘Bentham’ in Mill and
Bentham, pp. 132–75. For discussions of Mill’s epistemological position, ‘A System of Logic’ in
Collected Works, vols. VII and VIII, is important and his Autobiography edited by John M. Robson
(London: Penguin, 1998) is frequently cited in support of interpretations of his motivations. But
although Mill’s work at India House (as well as his father’s involvement with India House,
Bentham and the Utilitarians) is often mentioned, the question of Mill’s position on international
aﬀairs as such does not play a role. A good indication of the general perception of Mill is found in
The Cambridge Companion to Mill edited by John Skorupski (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998) in which only Robson’s chapter, one among fourteen, addresses Mill’s position on
civilisation and culture without, however, investigating their importance for his international theory.
As always, there are a few exceptions, some of which, however, tend to prove the rule. F. R.
Flournoy, ‘British Liberal Theories of International Relations 1848–1898’, Journal of the History of
Ideas, 7 (1946), pp. 195–217, and K. E. Miller, ‘John Stuart Mill’s Theory of International
Relations’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 22 (1961), pp. 493–514, are interested in Mill’s status
amongst British liberal internationalists of the 19th century. Lynn Zastoupil, John Stuart Mill and
India (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994) and Eileen Sullivan, ‘Liberalism and Empire:
J. S. Mill’s Defense of the British Empire’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 44 (1983), pp. 599–617,
investigate the impact of Mill’s India experience on his domestic writings, while A. L. Harris, ‘John
Stuart Mill: Servant of the East India Company’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 30 (1964),
pp. 185–202, and Souﬀrant, ‘Liberalism’, directly address Mill’s defence of colonialism.
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the same premises are used to construct a systematic justification of European
imperialism. The take up of Mill in IR has thus superficially sanitised his writings at
the price of avoiding an engagement with their real underlying logic – a logic,
however, which continues to inform liberal international theories today. Meanwhile,
contra Political Theory, the international dimension of Mill’s thought cannot be
excluded without running the risk of reproducing the very justifications for imperi-
alism which underlie his thought.
I will first reconstruct Mill’s philosophy of history and demonstrate its centrality
for his international theory (in the second part of this article), and for his political
theory (in the third). The critical analysis of the roots of Mill’s philosophy of history
in colonialism and its theoretical as well as political consequences for IR and Political
Theory will follow in the final section.
Mill’s philosophy of history
Mill sets out his philosophy of history in each of his major writings to some extent.5
The most detailed and systematic exposition, however, we find in Considerations on
Representative Government. Here Mill argues that representative government is the
best form of government – but only for civilised nations. He begins by stating that
‘political machinery does not act of itself. As it is first made, so it has to be worked,
by men, and even by ordinary men. It needs, not their simple acquiescence, but their
active participation; and must be adjusted to the capacities and qualities of such men
as are available.’6
Some nations, Mill goes on to argue, will never accept the restraints of a regular
and civilised government – such as North American Indians or the barbarians who
overran the Roman Empire. Some peoples will not accept a monarchy, others a
republic. Thus, it is essential to determine the particular stage of development of a
people in order to be able to determine the most appropriate form of government.
International or world history, the history of humankind, is essentially a history of
cultural – or, in his words, civilisational – development. Mill does not clearly define
the stages of civilisational development, but we can reconstruct a broad outline. The
first two stages, savagery and slavery, are fairly well described. The stage of savagery
is characterised by personal independence, by the absence of a developed social life,
and a lack of discipline either for unexciting work or for the submission to laws.7 All
civilised life, says Mill, depends on ‘continuous labour of an unexciting kind’. If
savages are to be civilised, therefore, they must be compelled to change their ways.
And for this reason ‘even personal slavery, by giving a commencement to industrial
life, and enforcing it as the exclusive occupation of the most numerous portion of the
community, may accelerate the transition to a better freedom than that of fighting
and rapine’. First and foremost, then, savages have to learn to obey and this can only
5 For the remainder of this article, references without an author’s name refer to writings of John
Stuart Mill. ‘Liberty’, pp. 11, 57, 66, 86; ‘Considerations’, especially chapter IV; ‘Bentham’, pp. 159,
164; ‘Coleridge’, pp. 193f; ‘Utilitarianism’, pp. 303f.
6 ‘Considerations’, p. 207.
7 Ibid., pp. 232, 260; John Stuart Mill, ‘Civilization’ in John M. Robson (ed.), The Collected Works of
John Stuart Mill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), vol. XVIII, p. 120.
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be achieved by force. Despotism and slavery are therefore the appropriate form of
government for savages and history shows that almost all peoples now civilised have
gone through this stage.8
Slavery and despotism, then, constitute the second stage of civilisational develop-
ment. But:
a people in that condition require to raise them out of it a very diﬀerent polity from a nation
of savages. . . . The step which they have to take, and their only path to improvement, is to be
raised from a government of will to one of law. . . . What they require is not a government of
force, but one of guidance. Being, however, in too low a state to yield to the guidance of any
but those to whom they look up as the possessors of force, the sort of government fittest for
them is one which possesses force, but seldom uses it’.9
Mill also calls this kind of government the government of ‘leading-strings’ and
compares it with the St. Simonian form of Socialism as well as, in history, with the
government of the Incas of Peru and the Jesuits in Paraguay.
After these first two clearly distinguished stages of development, Mill’s exposition
with regard to the terms he uses as well as with regard to the descriptions and
examples is much less clear. Only the highest stage of development is clearly termed
and described: it is modern civilisation and the most appropriate form of government
for this stage is representative government. Among the modern civilised nations
England occupies the highest stage.10 Between the stage of slavery and that of modern
civilisation we find terms such as barbarians, semi-barbarous, semi-civilised, but Mill
does not distinguish clearly between them. We can, thus, only reconstruct the
meaning of this stage/these stages (for it is by no means clear whether they are several
stages or just various cultural forms all belonging to one stage) by looking at the
arguments and examples he provides.
Civilisation, and therefore also representative government, require certain kinds of
material preconditions. One characteristic of civilised government is its extension
over a certain area. As long as public opinion depends on people being able to get
together within the confines of a city this form of government cannot stretch over
greater parts.11 Infrastructure and, in particular, roads were quite widely considered
a clear indicator of civilisation.12 But, generally, Mill is much more interested in what
he calls the moral preconditions for civilisation and representative government. Thus,
an inveterate spirit of locality stands in the way of extending the principles of
self-government over a wider realm – and this is true even of communities who have
had extensive experience of self-government such as Asian villages. If a people is very
passive they will not fight for their freedom when attacked and would choose tyrants
as their representatives. And only despotic rule or a general massacre could have
emancipated the serfs of Russia. If a people is ignorant and lacks mental cultivation,
if it is gullible, it may be cheated out of its freedom. If a people is too rude to control
its passions, to forgo private conflict, too proud not to avenge wrongs done to them
directly, it is not ready for self-government. The existence of prejudices, adherence to
old habits and a general incapacity to adapt to and accept constant changes are
8 ‘Considerations’, pp. 232, 233.
9 Ibid., pp. 233f.
10 ‘Non-Intervention’, pp. 111ﬀ; ‘Civilization’, pp. 120f.
11 ‘Considerations’, p. 210.
12 James Mill, The History of British India (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 1990), p. 479.
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hindrances to self-government; and, generally, not clearly specified ‘positive defects
of national character’.13
Though Mill does not spell out clearly which stage or stages we find between that
of slavery and civilisation, he clearly sees a host of characteristics which do not either
belong to the stage of savagery or slavery but still prevent representative government
from being appropriate. He reconstructs the history of humankind as a history of
cultural or civilisational development with, broadly four stages: savagism, slavery,
barbarism and, finally, modern civilisation. And this history is not just speculative; it
is based on concrete historical examples for all stages of development as well as for
the modes of government which fit those stages.
A full reconstruction of Mill’s philosophy of history, however, must also entail a
discussion of the dynamics which, in his opinion, drive these developments. Mill did
not believe that this progression from one stage to the next is in any way an automatic
process and he warns that there is always the possibility of the tide turning ‘towards
the worse, consisting of all the follies, all the vices, all the negligences, indolences and
supineness of mankind . . . until it reached a state often seen in history, and in which
many large portions of mankind even now grovel’. This danger of stagnation or even
backward development is what we learn if ‘the whole testimony of history is worth
anything’.14
Again, Mill cites historical examples to illustrate the tendency towards stagnation
or backward development which he considers
among the most melancholy facts in history. The Egyptian hierarchy, the paternal despotism
of China, were very fit instruments for carrying those nations up to the point of civilisation
which they attained. But having reached that point, they were brought to a permanent halt, for
want of mental liberty and individuality; requisites of improvement which the institutions that
had carried them thus far, entirely incapacitated them from acquiring, and as the institutions
did not break down and give place to others, further improvement stopped.15
The reason for this tendency towards stagnation is that indigenous rule, as the
examples of Asia show, cannot generally be expected to adapt to the next level of
civilisation, because the rulers will not be exempt from the ‘general weakness of the
people or of the state of civilisation’. Only in very rare cases will a people be lucky
enough to find a monarch of extraordinary genius, like Charlemagne or Peter the
Great, who will be able to lead them to the next stage. Civilisational development is
therefore not to be expected as a matter of course but must be pursued consciously.
The most potent means, Mill argues, of preparing people for the next stage of
civilisational development is the form of government.16
Historically, therefore, two diﬀerent roads to civilisational development can be
identified. The first is the exception, namely government through an indigenous
leader of extraordinary genius; the second is the rule, namely government through a
culturally superior power carrying the people ‘rapidly through several stages of
progress, and clearing away obstacles to improvement which might have lasted
indefinitely if the subject population had been left unassisted to its native tendencies
and chances’.17
13 ‘Considerations’, pp. 262, 261, 264, 212.
14 Ibid., pp. 224, 241.
15 Ibid., pp. 234f.
16 Ibid., pp. 264, 231.
17 Ibid., p. 264.
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To complete the picture of Mill’s philosophy of history, we need to mention that
forward movement along this line of civilisational development is de rigeur. Though
Mill argues in his philosophical writings that human beings have to fulfil their
developmental potential, that, indeed, the latter is what distinguishes human beings
from other species,18 he also puts forward a political argument based on historical
experience. A stationary condition like the Oriental state ‘does not mean stupid
tranquillity, with security against change for the worse; it often means being overrun,
conquered and reduced to domestic slavery, either by a stronger despot, or by the
nearest barbarous people who retain along with their savage rudeness the energies of
freedom’.19 The stationary condition is therefore not a practical choice because it
turns the people into easy prey for conquerors and this, in turn, means slavery and
backward development.
Mill’s philosophy of history, then, contains the four broad stages of civilisational
development – savagism, slavery, barbarism and civilisation – and he identifies the
force which drives this development, namely the mode of government. Since
development along civilisational lines is not automatic, and since stagnation entails
the grave danger of conquest and backward development, human beings have to
strive for the next level of development by establishing the appropriate form of
government for this purpose. This philosophy of history is the basis of Mill’s theory
of international relations.
Mill’s theory of international relations
John Stuart Mill, I will argue, developed a distinctive theory of international relations
on the basis of his philosophy of history. Triggered by events ‘generated by my
Indian experience and others by the international questions which then greatly
occupied the European public’, Mill wrote A Few Words on Non-Intervention setting
out ‘the true principles of international morality’.20 His theory of international
relations, as set out in A Few Words on Non-Intervention but also in Considerations
on Representative Government is clearly a moral theory. Not only does the civilisa-
tional stage of a people determine the most appropriate form of government, the
government itself is an institution for moralising and improving the people. For this
reason, Mill argues that the government appropriate for a particular stage of
development is the one which enables the people to move on to the next stage. This
moral task, this responsibility towards the people is, however, not the final criterion,
for ‘the influence of government’ he says, ‘on the well-being of society can be
considered or estimated in reference to nothing less than the whole of the interests of
humanity’.21 It is this universal principle – the whole of the interests of humanity –
which determine the quality of any given government as well as the criteria for
ordering international aﬀairs in general.
18 John M. Robson, ‘Rational Animals and Others’, in John M. Robson and Michael Laine (eds.),
James and John Stuart Mill/Papers of the Centenary Conference (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1976), p. 159.
19 ‘Considerations’, p. 241.
20 ‘Autobiography’, p. 195.
21 ‘Considerations’, p. 217.
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The whole of the interests of humanity lie in improvement, progress, development
along civilisational lines. Thus, Mill’s theory of international relations is based on a
distinction between culturally superior and inferior peoples. In their practical
application, the four stages of civilisational development are reduced to two:
barbarians (used interchangeably with savages) and civilised nations. ‘To suppose
that the same international customs, and the same rules of international morality, can
obtain between one civilised nation and another, and between civilised nations and
barbarians, is a grave error, and one which no statesman can fall into’. Mill gives two
main reasons for this distinction:
In the first place, the rules of ordinary international morality imply reciprocity. But barbarians
will not reciprocate. They cannot be depended on for observing any rules. . . . In the next place,
nations which are still barbarous have not got beyond the period during which it is likely to
be for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners’.22
A further diﬀerence between barbarism and civilisation is the absence or presence of
nationalism. Mill defines nationality as a community of people with common
sympathies who cooperate better with each other than with outsiders and who like to
be under the same government.23 Although he holds that human beings are social by
nature, this tendency becomes stronger with advancing civilisation.24 Savages live
singly or in small groups, do not enjoy each other’s company, and do not cooperate
(except in war) whereas one of the distinguishing features of modern civilisation is
sociality and cooperation.25 Hence, nationalism is itself a clear characteristic of
civilisation and ‘barbarians have no rights as a nation, except a right to such
treatment as may, at the earliest possible period, fit them for becoming one’.26
Thus having divided humanity into culturally superior – civilised – and culturally
inferior – barbarian – peoples, Mill sets out the principles which ought to rule
international relations. The relations between civilised nations are generally governed
by the principle of equality. Mill supports the principle of free trade and of equal
opportunities in this free trade. He also suggests that international law and an
International Tribunal is ‘now one of the most prominent wants of civilised society,
a real International Tribunal’27 along the lines of the American Supreme Court,
which in his opinion made international law, should operate between these civilised
nation states. ‘Among civilised peoples, members of an equal community of nations,
like Christian Europe’, aggressive war, conquest and annexation are out of the
question; what needs to be decided in this relationship between civilised nations is the
question of interference. In general, Mill argues for a principle of non-intervention
because ‘a government which needs foreign support to enforce the obedience of its
own citizens, is one which ought not to exist’. Similarly, a people whose desire for,
and capability of achieving, freedom against its own government is not strong enough
to be able to retain the freedom given to it by foreign intervention.28
He makes two exceptions to the rule of non-intervention. In cases in which foreign
intervention has already taken place, counter-intervention is admissible to even the
22 ‘Non-Intervention’, p. 118.
23 ‘Considerations’, pp. 427f; ‘Coleridge’, p. 195.
24 ‘Utilitarianism’, p. 303.
25 ‘Civilization’, p. 120.
26 ‘Non-Intervention’, p. 119.
27 ‘Considerations’, p. 441.
28 ‘Non-Intervention’, p. 120–2.
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balance. And in the case of a protracted civil war a powerful neighbour can demand
that the conflict cease and that reconciliation take place ‘on equitable terms of
compromise’. Mill argues that this kind of intervention has taken place fairly
frequently without raising major complaints, so that one has to assume ‘that its
legitimacy may be considered to have passed into a maxim of what is called
international law’.29
The relations between sovereign states and dependencies are also governed by the
level of cultural development. Mill divides dependencies into two classes: one is
composed of people of similar civilisation as the mother country and fit for
institutions of representative government, such as British possessions in America and
Australia; the other is composed of much less advanced people, such as India. For the
colonies of European race Mill argues for the widest possible measure of internal
self-government. There are some inequalities still in the system since Britain retains
the powers of a Federal Government which means that the former colonies have no
sovereignty over their foreign policy and have to join Britain in war without being
consulted. Mill argues that the bonds between Britain and the settler colonies have to
be severed if the settler colonies desire this. However, these bonds are, in his opinion,
very valuable because they can be considered a step ‘towards universal peace, and
general friendly co-operation among nations’. On the one hand, it makes war
between the members of the Commonwealth impossible, on the other, it prevents any
member being incorporated into a foreign state as well as from becoming an
aggressive power in their own right. Furthermore, these bonds provide an open
market at least for its members and the connection adds weight to the moral influence
of Great Britain in the councils of the world, that is, to the ‘Power which, of all in
existence, best understands liberty . . . and has attained to more of conscience and
moral principle in its dealings with foreigners, than any other great nation seems
either to conceive as possible, or recognise as desirable’.30
While relations between civilised nations – whether independent states or not – are
governed by the principle of equality, relations between civilised and barbarian
peoples ought to take the form of a hierarchy. Again, these unequal relations we
encounter either in the form of interaction between independent communities or in
the form of dependencies or multinational countries. While Mill holds that ‘free
institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of diﬀerent nationalities’, he
also considers the merging of diﬀerent nationalities a possibility. Hence, the decisive
question for a multinational state is whether the culturally superior group is in the
majority. If so, as is often the case in European countries, the incorporation of the
backward minority is not only justified but must be considered in its interest.31
Diﬀerent rules, however, must apply if the culturally inferior population is in the
majority or powerful enough to conquer a culturally superior nation. The latter,
exemplified historically by the Macedonian conquest of Greece or a hypothetical
ascendancy of Russia over Europe ‘is a sheer mischief to the human race, and one
which civilised humanity with one accord should rise in arms to prevent’. In the
former case, exemplified historically by the Greeks in Asia and more contempor-
aneously by the British in India, ‘the conquerors and the conquered cannot . . . live
29 ‘Non-Intervention’, pp. 123, 121. See Varouxakis ‘Intervention’ for a detailed discussion of the
development of Mill’s position on intervention between European states.
30 ‘Considerations’, pp. 447, 449, 451.
31 Ibid., pp. 428, 431, 433f.
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together under the same free institutions’ because the absorption of a culturally
superior people into an inferior civilisational stage would be an evil. The conquered
have to be governed by despotism, ‘a mode of government . . . as legitimate as any
other, if it is the one which in the existing state of civilisation of the subject people,
most facilitates their transition to a higher stage of improvement’ – not only that,
‘such is the ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous or semi-barbarous one’.32
Though it is clear that the civilising mission which Mill supports is the moral and
political legitimation of this despotism, he does not call it anything else but despotism.
He makes it abundantly clear that this kind of rule is despotism and the only choice
the governing nation has is over the kind of despotism it wants to exert. In line with his
defence of the rule of India through the EIC, Mill continues to argue that the
despotism of one people over another – that is, of the English people represented
through their parliament over India – is not better but in fact worse than the despot-
ism of its most competent governors. For Mill the government of one people by
another is an impossibility: ‘One people may keep another as a warren or preserve for
its own use, a place to make money in, a human cattle farm to be worked for the profit
of its own inhabitants. But if the good of the governed is the proper business of a
government, it is utterly impossible that a people should directly attend to it.’ For
Mill, then, the best the English can do for India is to give it good governors and British
ministers are the worst possible governors, for they think about English, not Indian,
politics; they don’t stay in oﬃce long enough to acquire any proper knowledge of the
country; they are susceptible to English public opinion and do not have the training to
form their own opinion on such a complex issue as Indian politics.33
It is clear, then, that John Stuart Mill did not just utter A Few Words on Non-
Intervention pertaining to sovereign European states, as his commentators in IR
suggest – rather he provided a full blown theory of international relations. The principle
which governs non-intervention and intervention – or the selective application of the
right to sovereignty/liberty – is the stage of civilisational development set out in his
philosophy of history. The attempt, therefore, in IR to separate A Few Words on
Non-Intervention from Mill’s ‘eurocentrism’, which Brown, Nardin and Rengger rela-
tivise by pointing out that it only expressed the common prejudice of his time,34
overlooks that precisely this ‘prejudice’ lies at the heart of Mill’s philosophy of history
and provides the principle on which the whole of Mill’s theory of international relations
rests. Mill systematically applies the principle of civilisational development to inter-
national aﬀairs on a global scale. Accordingly, the civilisational stage of every commu-
nity has to be ascertained and the world divided up into civilised and non-civilised
peoples. In principle, non-civilised peoples ought to be ruled by civilised peoples and
equality and non-intervention characterise the relations between civilised nations.
Mill’s political theory
Mill’s philosophy of history centred around culture also provides the basis for his
most important writings on domestic politics. Mill defines civilisation either as
32 Ibid., pp. 432, 453, 454.
33 Ibid., pp. 455, 456, 461.
34 Brown et al., ‘International Relations’, p. 465.
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progress or improvement in general, as a state in which man and society are ‘happier,
nobler, wiser’ or as ‘that kind of improvement only, which distinguishes a wealthy
and powerful nation from savages or barbarians’. And it is the second definition –
with reference to barbarians and, thus, his philosophy of history – which provides the
basis for his thought on domestic politics and the one which he chooses as a starting
point for the discussion in Civilisation. For only in this sense, he says, may one speak
about the ‘vices or the miseries of civilisation’.35 And, it will be argued here, that his
entire political theory is an attempt to counteract the vices and miseries of
civilisation.36
Civilisation in this sense is not just defined in the necessary context of, or
opposition to, barbarism; Mill actually defines civilisation as the negation of
barbarism. ‘We shall on the present occasion use the word civilisation only in the
restricted sense: . . . in which it is the direct converse or contrary of rudeness or
barbarism. Whatever be the characteristics of what we call savage life, the contrary
of these, or the qualities which society puts on as it throws oﬀ these, constitute
civilisation.’ And he follows this method in his substantive definition of civilisation,
that is, he sets out the characteristics of barbarism and then deduces the character-
istics of civilisation from their negation. ‘Thus, a savage tribe consists of a handful
of individuals, wandering or thinly scattered over a vast tract of country: a dense
population, therefore, dwelling in fixed habitations, and largely collected together in
towns and villages, we term civilized’. And he continues that savage life has no
commerce, no manufacture, no agriculture, that savages do not cooperate and don’t
enjoy each other’s company, there is no law, no justice, and no protection of property
or people. The opposite, of course, characterises civilisation, that is, commerce,
manufacture and agriculture, cooperation and social intercourse, law, justice and
protection of people and property. These elements of civilisation exist in modern
Europe and especially in Great Britain.37
Mill’s political theory arises out of an analysis of this civilisation. He argues that
there are two elements of importance among mankind, namely property and the
power of the mind. One of the outstanding characteristics of civilisation, he contends,
is the diﬀusion of property and education to the masses which were formerly held by
a tiny minority of individuals. And this diﬀusion has the eﬀect that ‘the portion of
either of these which can belong to an individual must have a tendency to become less
and less influential, and all results must more and more be decided by the movements
of masses; provided that the power of combination among the masses keeps pace
with the progress of their resources’. Cooperation is, then, in his opinion the third
distinguishing characteristic of civilisation and he goes on to show that the downfall
of savage, barbarian, enslaved or semi-civilised societies in history has been their
incapacity to cooperate, especially in war.38
The problem, however, which civilisation faces, is that the mass society which
gives more wealth and education to the individual than ever before in history is in
danger of losing the genius which individuals can give to society. The upper classes
lose their cultural advantage and with it the ability to lead society in the direction of
35 ‘Civilization’, p. 119.
36 Nadia Urbinati, Mill on Democracy (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 179;
Passavant, ‘No Escape’, pp. 101, 109.
37 ‘Civilization’, pp. 120f.
38 Ibid., p. 122.
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improvement. Morally, civilisation channels the energy of the individual into ‘the
narrow sphere of money-getting pursuits’. In comparison, ‘in a rude state, each man’s
personal security, the protection of his family, his property, his liberty itself, depend
greatly upon his bodily strength and his mental energy or cunning: in a civilised state,
all this is secured to him by causes extrinsic to himself’. In addition, ‘the individual
becomes so lost in the crowd, that though he depends more and more upon opinion,
he is apt to depend less and less on well-grounded opinion . . . An established
character becomes at once more diﬃcult to gain, and more easily to be dispensed
with.’39
Mill states that ‘the natural tendency of representative government, as of
modern civilisation, is towards collective mediocrity: and this tendency is increased
by all reductions and extensions of the franchise, their eﬀect being to place the
principal power in the hands of classes more and more below the highest level of
instruction in the community’.40 The loss of individuality, of genius, of energy and
innovation, then, are the ‘vices and miseries of civilisation’. Mill’s analysis makes it
clear that these shortcomings are inherent tendencies of civilisation and neither the
product of deviation from the proper course of civilisational development nor
marginal side eﬀects. In fact, they are extremely dangerous because ‘when society
is itself the tyrant – society collectively over the separate individuals who
compose it – its means of tyrannising are not restricted to the acts which it may
do by the hands of its political functionaries’. This kind of tyranny in civilised
society takes the form of a public opinion which endeavours ‘to make everyone
conform to the approved standard . . . to maim by compression, like a Chinese lady’s
foot’.41
The danger which Mill identifies lies in a development which turns culture into
custom, that is, which halts the movement towards progress and innovation. ‘The
despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement,
being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than
customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that
of progress or improvement’. His prime historical example for the dangers of this
development is ‘the whole East’, but in particular China. The Chinese, Mill
emphasises, had actually built a formidable civilisation, but with all their talent and
wisdom, instead of leading the world towards progress, ‘they have become
stationary – have remained so for thousands of years . . . they have succeeded beyond
all hope in what English philantropists are so industriously working at – in making
a people all alike’. Unless this tendency of civilisation can be counteracted, Mill
argues, Europe ‘will tend to become another China’.42
We can see here that the philosophy of history centred on cultural development is
not just in the abstract or as a logical part of the definition important for Mill’s
political theory. It contains, as mentioned above, the crucial belief that cultural
development can stop and turn backwards and it provides him with concrete
historical examples of the consequences of this. Not only is civilisation the negation
of barbarism, but it also has to constantly strive against its internal tendencies to
become stationary, to suppress individuality and non-conformism.
39 Ibid., pp. 125f, 129, 132.
40 ‘Considerations’, p. 313.
41 ‘Liberty’, pp. 6, 65.
42 Ibid., pp. 66–8.
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Since Mill considers these tendencies as an integral part of civilisation, the
question arises whether civilisation is ‘on the whole a good or an evil’. Mill leaves no
doubt that he considers it a good and although it does not provide for much even of
the highest goods it is also not incompatible with any good. Mill’s domestic project,
then, lies in finding remedies for these negative tendencies, in infusing civilisation
with the means to achieve the goods it does not provide for. ‘Those advantages which
civilization cannot give – which in its uncorrected influence it has even a tendency to
destroy – may yet coexist with civilization’.43
In On Liberty, Mill sets out the strategies which society should adopt to counteract
this mediocritising influence of civilisation. Crucial in his mind is the protection of the
private sphere from the pressures of public opinion; the freedom of thought and
discussion; the development of individual genius and mental superiority; of free trade
as the equivalent to individual freedom; diﬀerent forms of education, including elite
education, since state education puts everybody under conformist influences,44 and
weighted suﬀrage. He also propagates tests to ensure the quality of the executive.
England, he holds, displays an abominable attitude toward education and can learn
a lot from the experiences of the EIC which has introduced tests for those aspiring to
serve in it.45
One could say that Mill’s remedy for the ‘vices and miseries of civilisation’ is the
introduction of as much plurality as possible in society and building up a class of
mentally superior people with more influence than others is part of his programme.
The logic of his argument in On Liberty leads him to profess on the last page – just
before he gives some examples of how to apply these principles – that he is not aware
‘that any community has a right to force another to be civilised’:
If civilisation has got the better of barbarism when barbarism had the world to itself, it is too
much to profess to be afraid lest barbarism, after having been fairly got under, should revive
and conquer civilisation. A civilisation that can thus succumb to its vanquished enemy, must
first have become so degenerate that neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody
else, has the capacity, or will take the trouble, to stand up for it. If this be so, the sooner such
a civilisation receives notice to quit the better. It can only go on from bad to worse, until
destroyed and regenerated (like the Western Empire) by energetic barbarians.46
John Stuart Mill’s political theory, thus, is inextricably bound up with his philosophy
of history in general and barbarians in particular. Just as in the international context,
in the political application of this philosophy of history the original four stages are
reduced to a simple juxtaposition between civilised and noncivilised. Mill derives his
understanding of civilisation from a description of barbarism; he identifies tendencies
within civilisation which might result in its slipping back into barbarism exemplified
by China; he propagates the fostering of individuality in order to prevent this fate;
but should this fail and civilisation deteriorate too far, it were better for it to be
‘destroyed and regenerated by energetic barbarians’. There is not a single step in his
argument about domestic politics in which his philosophy of history represented
through the barbarians does not play a crucial role. Indeed, the barbarian is
civilisation’s historical self, its contemporary other, its internal other and its future
self.
43 ‘Civilization’, pp. 119, 135.
44 ‘Liberty’, pp. 14, 17ﬀ, 53ﬀ, 88, 98.
45 ‘Considerations’, pp. 335–8, 406f.
46 ‘Liberty’, p. 86.
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Imperialism, political theory, and IR
Mill’s philosophy of history underlying both his political and his international
theory, however, is itself rooted in the experience and practice of colonialism.47 Mill
develops the unequal political relationship between colonial power and colonised
population into a general philosophy of history which underlies, in turn, his
international and political theory.48 He shares with other Enlightenment authors the
assumption of cultural development for all of humankind and the ranking of existing
as well as extinct societies on a scale of civilisation49 – a literature with which he was
well acquainted.50 Such philosophies of history had, moreover, been used for
centuries to justify the exclusion of internal as well as external ‘barbarians’ – that is,
women, children, slaves, workers and non-European peoples who were not deemed
to have the necessary qualiﬁed reason to enjoy equal rights of liberty.51 Yet, there are
two aspects which distinguish his theory from those of his predecessors. Firstly, he
directly links diﬀerent stages of development to diﬀerent forms of government.
Consequently, secondly, the principle of liberty is for Mill not universal but only
valid for modern civilisation.
That the experience of colonialism lies at the root of Mill’s philosophy of history
is firstly borne out by his methodological position. As an empiricist Mill believes that
all insight depends on experience.52 More concretely, he holds, that ‘almost all
principles which have been durable were first suggested by observation of some
47 Souﬀrant, ‘Transgressions’, p. 103.
48 Mehta, ‘Liberalism’, p. 93.
49 See Beate Jahn, The Cultural Construction of International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000),
and Ronald L. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1976), for an account of the general importance of a philosophy of history based on
civilisational stages for Enlightenment thought. This philosophy of history, thus, does not only
haunt liberalism but famously Marxism as well. See, for instance, Friedrich Engels, The Origin of
the Family, Private Property and the State (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1978). While Marxists
have tended to criticise capitalist colonial adventures, Marx still considered the destruction of
indigenous cultures through European colonialism as a necessary step towards progress and
communism. See Karl Marx, ‘The British Rule in India’ in Surveys from Exile, edited by David
Fernbach (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973). Neither was Mill the only author who saw the
corrupting nature of civilisation. Jean Jacques Rousseau probably took this argument furthest in his
‘Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’ in The Social Contract and Discourses (London: J. M. Dent,
1993). Since civilisation and savagery were defined in relational terms, the ambivalent conception of
civilisation was generally matched by an ambivalent conception of savagery as the lowest, natural,
rung on the developmental ladder, yet as such simultaneously providing the basic values for an ideal
society based on human nature. For a discussion see Jahn, ‘Cultural Construction’, pp. 122ﬀ.
50 In On Liberty (p. 45) he comments approvingly on Rousseau’s disruptive arguments for the 18th
century belief in the unfettered and automatic good of civilisation; he has written two extensive
reviews of Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (Collected Works, vol. XVIII, pp. 47–90, 153–204);
he knew Montesquieu’s writings, even if not commenting on them in ‘Montesquieu’ (Collected
Works, vol. XXVI, pp. 443–53); he discusses Locke and Kant, for instance, in ‘Coleridge’ (p. 186f);
and, having read the proof sheets at an early age, he knew the literature his father had used in the
History of British India which included travel literature, Adam Ferguson’s An Essay on the History
of Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), and Voltaire, in addition to a
variety of publications on India as well as other non-European and ancient nations (James Mill
provides extensive notes and references at the end of each chapter of his History). James Mill was
deeply influenced by the Scottish Enlightenment and, in particular, by its philosophical history as
represented in Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, John Millar and Dugald Stewart. See J. H. Burns,
‘The Light of Reason: Philosophical History in the Two Mills’ in Robson et al. (eds.), ‘James and
John Stuart Mill’, p. 4.
51 Mehta, ‘Liberalism’, pp. 31, 36, 49, 76; Hindess, ‘What’s in a Name?’.
52 ‘Coleridge’, p. 188.
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particular case, in which the general laws of nature acted in some new or previously
unnoticed combination of circumstances’ and in this vein he argues that ‘it has been
the destiny of the government of the East India Company, to suggest the true theory
of the government of a semi-barbarous dependency by a civilised country’.53
Secondly, Mill’s biography suggests that imperialism in general and the British
rule of India in particular were foundational for his thought. He read the proofsheets
of his father’s History of British India – written in support of, and aiming to improve,
British rule in India – as part of his education. James Mill sets out the theory of four
stages of civilisational development. Unlike most of his predecessors who widely
regarded India as an example of an admirably high civilisation, James Mill takes
great pains to demonstrate that the Indians are characterised by ‘one of the rudest
and weakest states of the human mind’. Clearly, this ‘fact’ justifies British rule over
India but it also explains the shortcomings of British government in India (or, rather,
blames the low level of Indian civilisation for it) for ‘no scheme of government can
happily conduce to the ends of government unless it is adapted to the state of the
people for whose use it is intended’.54 John Stuart Mill praises the book as
contributing largely to his education and, though he does have some criticisms, as
‘one of the most instructive histories ever written, and one of the books from which
most benefit may be derived by a mind in the course of making up its opinions’. And
he held that it was only one of his father’s minor merits to have been the ‘originator
of all sound statesmanship in regard to the subject of his largest work, India’.55 John
Stuart Mill, thus, encountered the theory of civilisational stages of development,
directly linked to the question of government in general and the government of India
in particular, very early on in his education.
Subsequently, with his father’s help, John Stuart Mill himself is employed at India
House and spends the next 35 years, until the abolition of East India Company rule,
with the administration of the government of India. He reports in his Autobiography
that working at India House added a good sense of the diﬃculties of practical politics
to his training as a speculative writer.56 And this work, as Sullivan and Zastoupil
have demonstrated, strongly influenced Mill’s philosophical and political writings.57
Furthermore, whatever contradictions or inconsistencies are found in Mill’s writings
in general,58 there can be no such doubt about his position concerning the rule of
India through the East India Company; it was in his opinion the best possible rule
which he defended to the day it was abolished by parliament.59
Institutions need to be radically diﬀerent, according to the stage of advancement already
reached. The recognition of this truth, though for the most part empirically rather than
philosophically, may be regarded as the main point of superiority in the political theories of the
present above those of the last age; in which it was customary to claim representative
53 ‘Considerations’, p. 466.
54 J. Mill, ‘History’, pp. 461, 456.
55 ‘Autobiography’, pp. 40, 158.
56 Ibid., pp. 80f.
57 Sullivan, ‘Mill’s Defense’; Zastoupil, ‘Mill and India’.
58 John Gray, ‘Introduction’ in On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998),
pp. xxi, xxix.
59 See ‘Autobiography’, p. 182; ‘Considerations’, pp. 396–8, 406f, 466; The Petition of the East India
Company and various other documents relating to the abolition of the Company’s rule in 1858,
published in ‘Writings on India’ in Collected Works, vol. XXX.
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democracy for England or France by arguments which would equally have proved it the only
fit form of government for Bedouins or Malays.60
It is his ‘empirical’ recognition that the mode of government has to be linked to
stages of development with the result that the principle of liberty is not universal but
only valid for modern civilisation, which constitutes the superiority of his theory over
those of his predecessors.
Mill’s philosophy of history is the result of the attempt to provide a moral
justification for the empirical experience of unequal power relations between Britain
and India, and European and non-European cultures in general. That this is the
object of Mill’s philosophy of history becomes clear in the attempt he makes to turn
the military inequality between Britain and India into moral inequality. Both Mill
and his father believed that British rule in India had been established through
military superiority. Both argued that ‘war is the most serious business of a
barbarous people’61 and that ‘rude’ nations are ‘incessantly harassed by the dangers,
or following the gains of war’. From this assumption, James Mill concluded that ‘one
of the first applications of knowledge is, to improve the military art’.62 Therefore,
Indian military inferiority – in particular the lack of discipline which both Mill and
his father equate with cooperation – is a clear sign of civilisational backwardness.63
Indeed, Mill argues that it is discipline, cooperation as an attribute of civilisation,
which explains the outcome not just of wars between civilised and rude, enslaved,
semi-civilised nations in history ‘from Marathon downwards’, but even of contem-
porary European politics in which ‘imperfectly civilised’ people like the Spaniards
could never win against Napoleon because they were unable to cooperate properly;
more generally, and on the international level, ‘none but civilised nations have ever
been able to form an alliance’.64 Thus, political, and in particular military, inequality
is Mill’s point of departure – and that of other British imperialists at the time.65
‘Ironically the facts of history become the basis for establishing a theory of history
and governance’ in which inequalities of power are turned into moral inequalities.
The justification of imperialism, thus, is an integral part of Millian political and
international theory; yet neither Political Theory nor IR have critically engaged with
its implications.66 The selective reading of Mill in both disciplines – based on an
acceptance of the separation of the domestic from the international – hides the roots
of Mill’s contradictions and perpetuates their political implications in today’s world.
Mill’s philosophy of history emphatically states that civilisation is morally and
politically superior to all the lower stages of development. And on this basis Mill
provides a moral justification for the general ordering of international aﬀairs based
on the rule of civilised over barbarian peoples. However, in his ‘domestic’ writings
Mill depicts civilisation as a form of society ‘which in its uncorrected influence . . .
has . . . a tendency to destroy’ the highest goods.67 In this context, Mill compares
barbarism favourably with civilisation:
60 ‘Considerations’, p. 231.
61 ‘Civilization’, p. 122.
62 J. Mill, ‘History’, p. 481.
63 ‘Civilization’, p. 122; J. Mill, ‘History’, pp. 469, 481.
64 ‘Civilization’, p. 123.
65 Mehta, ‘Liberalism’, 91, 78, 76, 89; Parekh, ‘Decolonizing Liberalism’, p. 92f.
66 Mehta, ‘Liberalism’, pp. 93, 5f.
67 ‘Civilization’, p. 135.
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Take for instance the question how far mankind have gained by civilisation. One observer
is forcibly struck by the multiplication of physical comforts; the advancement and diﬀusion
of knowledge; the decay of superstition; the facilities of mutual intercourse; the softening of
manners; the decline of war and personal conflict; the progressive limitation of the tyranny
of the strong over the weak; the great works accomplished throughout the globe by the
co-operation of multitudes: and he becomes that very common character, the worshipper of
‘our enlightened age’. Another fixes his attention, not upon the value of these advantages, but
upon the high price which is paid for them; the relaxation of individual energy and courage;
the loss of proud and self-relying independence; the slavery of so large a portion of mankind
to artificial wants; their eﬀeminate shrinking from even a shadow of pain; the dull unexciting
monotony of their lives, and the passionless insipidity, and absence of any marked individu-
ality, in their characters; the contrast between the narrow mechanical understanding, produced
by a life spent in executing by fixed rules a fixed task, and the varied powers of the man of the
woods, whose subsistence and safety depend at each instant upon his capacity of extemporarily
adapting means to ends; the demoralising eﬀect of great inequalities in wealth and social rank;
and the suﬀerings of the great mass of the people of civilised countries, whose wants are
scarcely better provided for than those of the savage, while they are bound by a thousand
fetters in lieu of the freedom and excitement which are his compensations.68
In fact, Mill insists that all the inventions of which civilisation is so proud have not
‘lightened the day’s toil of any human being’.69 In eﬀect, in his analysis of civilisation,
Mill not only demonstrates that moral progress has not taken place, he even doubts
that it can boast of having initiated material progress for the benefit of human beings.
In the domestic context, civilisation is lacking in the very characteristics –
development of individuality, liberty, creativity – which supposedly make it superior
to barbarism in the international context. And barbarism, in the domestic context,
oﬀers noble manifestations of human cultural development – including individuality,
liberty, creativity – the lack of which in the international context make it inferior to
civilisation.70
Mill may have taken the separation of the domestic from the international for
granted. Indeed, if he considered the greater part of ‘civilised’ populations together
with their ‘barbarian’ contemporaries as in need of ‘education’ or ‘development’ as
a precondition for the enjoyment of full rights of liberty and equality, this may not
stand in contradiction to the claim that modern civilisation itself was vastly superior
to ‘barbarian’ cultures. However, when we turn to Mill’s political strategies, we find
that he has to draw on the sphere of the ‘other’. Taken up with his domestic project
of counteracting the negative tendencies of civilisation, Mill finds the solution in the
cultural diversity of the international sphere. He prescribes a study of the ‘opinions
of mankind in all ages and nations’71 and argues that:
the culture of the human being had been carried to no ordinary height, and human nature had
exhibited many of its noblest manifestations, not in Christian countries only, but in the ancient
world, in Athens, Sparta, Rome; nay, even barbarians, as the Germans, or still more
unmitigated savages, the wild Indians, and again the Chinese, the Egyptians, the Arabs, all had
their own education, their own culture; a culture which, whatever might be its tendency on the
whole, had been successful in some respect or other. Every form of polity, every condition of
society, whatever else it had done, had formed its type of national character.72
68 ‘Coleridge’, p. 182.
69 ‘Principles’, p. 129.
70 Mehta, ‘Liberalism’, p. 100.
71 ‘Bentham’, p. 148.
72 ‘Coleridge’, p. 200.
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The noble manifestations of other cultures are to be recognised and studied in order
to diversify and enrich the narrow and limited tendencies of modern civilisation.
Similarly, the unlimited increase of wealth and population resulting in the destruction
of the earth’s ‘pleasantness’ for the mere purpose of enabling the support of a larger
‘but not a better or happier population’ leads him to recommend the stationary
state.73
Mill imports the means to save modern civilisation from the international sphere.
For here we find cultural diversity, coexistence, and stationary conditions. When
dealing with the international sphere, however, the same values of cultural diversity,
coexistence, and stagnation stand in the way of the improvement of humankind and
Mill exports the characteristics of domestic society – cultural homogeneity, political
hierarchy, and assimilation/progress – in order to deal with them. It is the domestic
context of On Liberty which leads Mill to argue that there is no right to civilise others,
and the international context of Considerations on Representative Government and
A Few Words on Non-Intervention which demands the civilising mission as a moral duty.
In fact, it is because Mill defines civilisation as a negation of barbarism that this
civilisation cannot exist without barbarism. And for this reason, too, the rights of
that civilisation – liberty, sovereignty, free speech – are not universally valid but
continually reconstituted as particular rights. Millian liberalism is not only coeval
with imperialism but also with nationalism; rather than constituting rights of the
individual against the community – as the liberal-communitarian debate suggests – it
actually constitutes the civilised community itself in opposition to internal and
external ‘barbarians’.74 The unfamiliar and backward represents a threat to this
liberalism and the relationship between the two can therefore only be a struggle ‘in
which power and not understanding must be deployed’.75
Accordingly, the international sphere plays an enormous role in defining that
barbarian enemy of liberalism at any given time. During the Cold War, communism
provided that threat and since its end ‘religious, especially Muslim fundamentalism,
has become the new liberal nightmare’.76 In the context of American legal discourse
on free speech, Passavant demonstrates that the Millian paradigm provides ‘a moral
geography of civilisation and barbarism that describes and delimits who merits
liberty’ or, more concretely, it oﬀers ‘a frame of inclusion and exclusion for
identifying a people for whom freedom of speech is appropriate and those for whom
it is not’. On the basis of this moral geography American members of Al Qaeda are
tried before civil courts while the ‘rest’ are held in Guantanamo Bay and tried before
military commissions – just as this same moral geography defines the positions
meriting the right to free speech in the domestic American discourse and those who
do not.77
The influence of this Millian paradigm, however, is not restricted to practical
politics but exerts its influence similarly in the academic sphere. Thus, liberals like
Joseph Raz and Brian Barry – whether they consider themselves Millian or not –
reproduce the major steps of Mill’s argument. Immigrant, especially Muslim,
73 ‘Principles’, pp. 126, 129.
74 Passavant, ‘No Escape’, p. 2; Mehta, ‘Liberalism’, pp. 101, 104; Parekh, ‘Decolonizing Liberalism’,
p. 98.
75 Mehta, ‘Liberalism’, p. 104; Parekh, ‘Decolonizing Liberalism’, p. 99.
76 Parekh, ‘Decolonizing Liberalism’, p. 94; Passavant, ‘No Escape’, p. 108.
77 Passavant, ‘No Escape’, pp. 93, 86, xiif.
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communities are depicted as a potential threat to the liberal way of life. Hence,
liberalism has the right to defend itself against that threat by means of interventionist
policies which either aim at the assimilation or the exclusion of these communities.78
Just as for Mill, neither the individual member of such a ‘nonliberal’ community nor
the community itself has a voice in these matters. Hence, Rawls excludes not just
‘outlaw states’ and ‘burdened societies’ but also every single one of their individual
members from all the original positions in which the Law of Peoples is being
decided.79 ‘Despite the expressed liberal commitment to the primacy of the individ-
ual, the person who is a member of the backward society or community cannot vouch
for him- or herself. He or she is spoken for by the society of which he or she is a
member, and that society is itself spoken for by the historiography that establishes
the particular stage of historical maturation that that society is deemed to have
achieved.’80
The same principle operates in the international sphere. It is widely and
uncritically accepted that modern civilisation – the West – embodies Mill’s principles
of liberty, individuality and progress resulting in a selective application of the
principle of sovereignty in the international sphere. Perfectly in line with Mill’s
argument, Western states are accorded the right to non-intervention while the rest
can be intervened against. Charles Beitz, for instance, argues for a right to
intervention in unjust states and a recognition of sovereignty and the principle of
non-intervention for just states.81 The same holds true for Andrew Linklater’s
division of the world into pluralist, solidarist and post-Westphalian societies of states
in ascending order, in which those states which exhibit a higher form of cultural and
moral development have the right to intervene in states of a lower stage of
development, but not the other way around.82
We find a similar division of the world in Michael Doyle’s ‘zone of peace’ made
up of democratic Western states confronted with the ‘zone of war’ made up of the
rest; or in Francis Fukuyama’s division of the world between ‘post-historical’
Western democratic capitalist states and the rest which still finds itself embroiled in
‘history’;83 and, of course, in Huntington’s ‘West versus the rest’.84 All these divisions
of humanity rely implicitly or explicitly on a philosophy of history which accords an
unequal moral status – and unequal rights – to diﬀerent cultures. Thus, Mill’s
justification of colonialism is of continuing relevance today, as Eddy Souﬀrant has
argued, because it provides the basis for ‘the implementation of a foreign policy of
intervention (which) constitutes the fundamental nature of imperialism’.85
This continuing influence of Mill on contemporary politics – domestic and
international – requires a serious and critical engagement with his work. Such an
engagement, however, is only possible if the disciplinary separation between Political
Theory and IR is overcome. For it is this separation which constitutes a systematic
barrier for the engagement of both disciplines with Mill’s philosophy of history and
78 Parekh, ‘Decolonizing Liberalism’, p. 95ﬀ.
79 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 81, 106.
80 Mehta, ‘Liberalism’, p. 112.
81 Beitz, ‘Political Theory’, pp. 91f.
82 Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), p. 167.
83 Michael Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and International Aﬀairs’, Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs, 12
(1983), pp. 217, 344; Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History’, The National Interest (1989).
84 Samuel Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Aﬀairs, 72 (1993).
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the ‘imperatives of imperial governance’ from which it arises.86 And it is this
separation, too, which hides the systematic nature of the exclusionary politics of the
Millian paradigm.
Political Theorists have identified the contradictions in Mill’s work, indeed, these
contradictions provide them with their puzzles: is he a systematic or an unsystematic
thinker;87 does he believe that ‘society is the work of man or man . . . the work of
society’;88 how does he reconcile the elements of permanence and progression in his
writings;89 what is methodologically dominant, the abstract utilitarian principles or
his philosophy of history?90 The most prominent puzzle in Mill’s thought for Political
theorists is the relationship between individual liberty on the one hand and the good
of society and/or state intervention on the other. The terms of the discussion
diﬀer – self-regarding versus other-regarding actions,91 liberty versus enforcement of
morality/state-intervention92 – and they lead to further problems in Mill’s thought –
regarding the constitution of the individual and its potential for development.93
Yet, the attempt to overcome this contradiction fails in the absence of an
engagement with Mill’s international thought and his philosophy of history. In this
vein, Nadia Urbinati presents Mill as a philosopher of deliberative democracy and
overlooks entirely that the moral and political contents of this deliberation is drawn
from a philosophy of history based on the distinction between civilisation and
barbarism which, as Passavant has shown, is constantly reproduced in the legal
discourse on free speech. According to Urbinati, ‘Mill’s denunciation of despotism’
is based on the fact that it is ‘such a great evil because it obstructs the path toward
independence and aims at keeping individuals in a status of perennial paternalism so
as to make them mentally and practically subaltern’.94 Not paying attention to Mill’s
international thought,95 however, she does not realise that this denunciator of
despotism in the domestic context considered despotism ‘the ideal rule of a free
people over a barbarous or semi-barbarous one’.96 In the international context, he
advocated exactly that form of government which aims – if unconsciously – at
keeping people perennially in a subaltern state. Urbinati, thus, reproduces the core
contradiction in Mill’s work: if despotism produces subaltern rather than auton-
omous beings, then it cannot be employed temporarily with the aim of enabling
86 Mehta, ‘Liberalism’, p. 91.
87 Gray, ‘Introduction’, pp. xxi, xxix; G. W. Smith, ‘The Logic of J. S. Mill on Freedom’, Political
Studies (1980), pp. 238–52.
88 Robson, ‘Rational Animals’, p. 146.
89 Edward Alexander, ‘The Principles of Permanence and Progression in the Thought of J. S. Mill’ in
Robson et al. (eds.), ‘James and John Stuart Mill’, pp. 126–42.
90 Burns, ‘Light of Reason’, pp. 3–20.
91 R. J. Halliday, ‘Some Recent Interpretations of John Stuart Mill’, Philosophy, 43 (1968), pp. 1–17.
92 M. Hollis, ‘J. S. Mill’s Political Philosophy of Mind’, Philosophy, 47 (1972), pp. 334–47; D. G.
Brown, ‘Mill on Liberty and Morality’, Philosophical Review Quarterly, LXXXI (1972), pp. 133–58;
C. L. Ten, ‘Mill and Liberty’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 30 (1969), pp. 47–68; T. Honderich,
‘The Worth of J. S. Mill ‘‘On Liberty’’ ’, Political Studies, XXII (1974), pp. 463–70.
93 R. F. Ladenson, ‘Mill’s Conception of Individuality’, Social Theory and Practice, 4 (1977),
pp. 167–82; G. L. Williams, ‘Mill’s Principle of Liberty’, Political Studies, XXIV (1976), pp. 132–40.
94 Urbinati, ‘Democracy’, pp. 178f.
95 In her entire study, Urbinati does not mention India, colonialism, imperialism or Mill’s philosophy
of history once. She represents Mill’s position on ‘backward peoples’ as ‘egalitarian and
participatory in principle’ because they are not considered ‘nonhuman’ and their enjoyment of equal
rights is only ‘temporarily’ suspended (‘Democracy’, p. 177).
96 ‘Considerations’, p. 454.
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people to more autonomy. Theoretically and politically, domestically and inter-
nationally, Millian discourses exclude liberalism’s ‘others’ from that highly praised
deliberation because they are defined as ‘others’ in a philosophy of history which
underlies and is prior to his political and international theory. And, as we have seen,
Mill’s domestic and international writings are directly linked, as are the rights of free
speech, of immigrant communities, and nonliberal states.
Yet, while Political Theorists like Mehta, Passavant, Parekh and others have
started to explore the foundational nature of the international in general and
imperialism in particular for Mill’s thought and its continuing influence in the
contemporary world, IR has remained entirely oblivious to both. If empire and
imperialism are now so widely discussed in IR, a thorough understanding of these
concepts and their continuing influence in the contemporary world may well require
a serious engagement with John Stuart Mill. This engagement, however, must
dispense with the idea that Mill wrote just A Few Words on Non-Intervention between
sovereign states. If the freedom of individual citizens of liberal states, of immigrant
communities and of nonliberal states is systematically curtailed in the name of the
‘war on terror’, IR may well be advised to take notice of Mill’s philosophical and
political writings as well.
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